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1 Introduction
In many areas of economic theory individuals are assumed to be endowed
with a utility function expressing their preferences over monetary outcomes.
Robson (1992, 1996a, and 1996b) and To (1999) provide evolutionary expla-
nations for the prevalence of speci…c risk attitudes. Dekel and Scotchmer
(1999) study conditions for the selection of risk taking in winner-take-all
games. Strobel (2001) shows that for chicken games a payo¤ monotone
dynamic would lead to a population of ever increasing risk taking.
In the study at hand I investigate in the context of the class of 2£2 games
without pure equilibrium which kinds of utility functions have the potential
to be best suited for promoting long term survival in an evolutionary model.
Speci…cally I compare the expected monetary payo¤s of players with risk
averse utility functions to that of players with risk neutral utility functions.
The restriction of the present analysis to the class of 2 £ 2 games with-
out pure equilibrium is motivated by simulations performed by Huck et al.
(1999). They simulated an evolutionary process selecting between agents
with di¤erent risk attitudes based on the equilibrium payo¤s in randomly
generated 2 £ 2 games. These simulations indicated an advantage for risk
averse players. The strength of this indication depended on the equilibrium
selection criterion applied to games with multiple equilibria. However, the
e¤ect of higher long term propagation of risk averse players was particularly
pronounced if attention was restricted to the class of 2 £ 2 games with no
pure equilibrium. These results yield the intuition that risk averse players
receive higher equilibrium payo¤s in this class.
In this note I prove that this intuition is indeed correct. To this aim let
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all payo¤s in a 2 £ 2 game be drawn from a uniform distribution on [0; 1]
and consider then only those games with no pure equilibrium. All these
games then have the same density. I concentrate on player 1 and compare
the expected payo¤ of a risk averse player with (…xed) utility function U(x)
and of a risk neutral player with utility function V (x) = x:
Let the payo¤-matrix of player 1 in a game G where player 1 chooses
between T and B and player 2 between L and R be
L R
T a b
B c d
:
Without loss of generality assume a > maxfb; c; dg: Then d > b holds if
there is only a mixed equilibrium.
The relative magnitude of c determines three cases.
1. a > c > d > b
2. a > d > c > b
3. a > d > b > c:
In the following section I show that risk aversion increases the expected
payo¤ compared to risk neutrality in each of the three subclasses of games
de…ned by these cases and thus over the whole class of 2 £ 2 games with no
pure equilibrium.
The primary result is in contrast to the e¤ects of risk aversion in bargain-
ing games. As outlined e.g. by Binmore et al. (1986), a concave transforma-
tion of a player’s utility function, i.e. if he becomes more risk averse (or more
impatient) changes the Nash bargaining solution in favor of the other player.
Increasing a player’s risk aversion weakens his bargaining position because
the risk of not reaching an agreement becomes more threatening to him. In
contrast, in the class of games studied here, the basic intuition (which is in
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this simplicity entirely correct only in case 1) is that increased risk aversion
of player 1 leads player 2 to increase the probability on player 1’s preferred
outcome to keep him indi¤erent and this bene…ts player 1. This is, of course,
a somewhat perverse argument common for mixed strategy equilibria.
In Section 3, I study the e¤ects of di¤erent levels of risk aversion. In
particular, I show that in cases 1 and 2 the expected payo¤ increases with
the degree of absolute risk aversion, whereas in case 3 a positive but …nite
level of risk aversion yields higher expected payo¤s then extreme levels of
risk aversion. Hence in an evolutionary model based on games of classes 1
and 2 the population would always tend towards consisting of players with
more extreme risk aversion, whereas it would tend to consisting of players
with …nite levels of risk aversion if only games of case 3 where played. I
also discuss to what extend the assumption of a uniform distribution of the
payo¤s can be relaxed.
Although the class of games dealt with in this note covers only a minor
part of the reality that people face, I believe that this result may be a
start to give a basis for an evolutionary explanation for the widely observed
phenomenon of risk aversion.
Note, that nothing is concluded about the utility levels. Hence although
a risk averse player would be in advantage compared to a risk neutral player
in an evolutionary model where the dynamic is driven by the given payo¤s,
it cannot be decided whether he also “feels happier”.
2 Analysis
The following proposition contains the main result.
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Proposition 1 The overall e¤ect of risk aversion of a player over the set
of 2£ 2 games with no pure equilibrium is an increase of his expected payo¤
in equilibrium.
The proof will be conducted separately for each of the three cases de…ned
in the introduction.
Case 1 a > c > d > b
Player 1 always prefers that player 2 chooses L since a > b and c > d: Let
p denote the probability that player 2 chooses L: Hence the expected payo¤
of player 1 increases with p: Lemma 2 then gives the crucial result.
Lemma 2 In cases 1 and 2 the equilibrium probability p that player 2
chooses L is higher if player 1 is risk averse then if player 1 is risk neutral.
Proof. Since a > c > b and a > d > b the risk associated with the
payo¤s is higher if player 1 chooses T than if he chooses B: While a risk
neutral player 1 will be indi¤erent between T and B if they yield the same
expected payo¤, a risk averse player 1 will only be indi¤erent if T yields
a higher expected payo¤ than B to compensate for the larger associated
risk. The latter requires that in equilibrium p is larger if player 1 is risk
averse since in case 1 a ¡ b > c¡ d implies that an increase of p has a larger
impact on the expected payo¤ for T than on that for B; while in case 2
since a ¡ b > 0 > c ¡ d an increase of p will increase the expected payo¤
for T and decrease that for B: Hence for both cases 1 and 2 player 2 will in
equilibrium choose L with a higher probability if player 1 is risk averse than
if he is risk neutral.
5
Since in any single game in case 1 the expected payo¤ to player 1 in-
creases with p, Lemma 2 implies that in equilibrium it is higher if player 1
is risk averse than if he is risk neutral.
Case 2 a > d > c > b
Let subsequently p¤ and p denote the equilibrium probability that player 2
chooses L if player 1 is risk neutral or risk averse, respectively.
Consider the class of games with …xed payo¤s a > d > c > b for player 1
and denote it by ¡ := ¡abcd: Note that this is actually a class of games since
the payo¤s for player 2 are not speci…ed. p¤ and p depend only on a; b; c; d
and are thus equal for all games in ¡: By Lemma 2 p > p¤: Lemma 3 gives
the key result for case 2.
Lemma 3 Over any class ¡ the expected payo¤ to player 1 increases with
the probability p that player 2 chooses L; if player 1 chooses his equilibrium
strategy.
Proof. Let q denote the equilibrium probability that player 1 chooses T in
a speci…c game. q depends only on the payo¤s to player 2. By exchanging
player 2’s payo¤ for (T;L) with that for (B; R) and that for (T; R) with that
for (B;L) while leaving the payo¤s to player 1 …xed, one obtains another
game in class ¡ with only a mixed equilibrium and the equilibrium proba-
bility of player 1 to choose T is 1 ¡ q: Since player 2’s payo¤s are all drawn
from the same distribution, both games have the same density. Therefore
over the class ¡; q is distributed symmetrically around 12 .
The expected payo¤s to player 1 for decisions L and R of player 2 in one
game are E(L) = qa + (1 ¡ q)c and E(R) = qb + (1 ¡ q)d. Therefore the
expected (with respect to the distribution of q over a class ¡ with density f)
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payo¤s to player 1 over a class of games ¡, given that he plays his equilibrium
strategy are
E¡(L) =
Z 1
0
(q(a ¡ c) + c)f(q)dq =
Z 1
0
cf(q)dq +
Z 1
0
q(a ¡ c)f(q)dq
= c + (a ¡ c)1
2
=
1
2
(a + c) and (1)
E¡(R) =
Z 1
0
(q(b ¡ d) + d)f(q)dq =
Z 1
0
df(q)dq +
Z 1
0
q(b ¡ d)f(q)dq
= d + (b ¡ d)1
2
=
1
2
(b + d); (2)
where (1) and (2) result from the symmetry of the distribution of q around 12 :
Then
E¡(L) ¡ E¡(R) = 12(a + c) ¡
1
2
(b + d) =
1
2
(a ¡ b ¡ (d ¡ c)) > 0 since a > d > c > b:
Therefore, the expected payo¤ to player 1 over a class of games ¡; given
that he chooses his equilibrium strategy, is higher if player 2 chooses L than
if player 2 chooses R and thus increases with p.
By Lemma 2 player 2 chooses L with higher probability if player 1 is
risk averse than if player 1 is risk neutral, i.e. p > p¤: Also p and p¤ are the
same for all games in one class ¡: Thus by Lemma 3 for any such class ¡ the
expected payo¤ to player 1 in equilibrium is higher if he is risk averse than
if he is risk neutral. Since the set of all games in case 2 falls into classes
¡abcd; the expected payo¤ to player 1 over the whole set is increased by risk
aversion.
Case 3 a > d > b > c
While the expected payo¤ for player 1 is increased by risk aversion for
any single game in case 1 and over any class of games with …xed payo¤s for
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player 1 in case 2, the situation is less straightforward in case 3.
Consider a game G1 with payo¤s a1 > d1 > b1 > c1 and additionally
a1 ¡ b1 > d1 ¡ c1: Then there is a game G2 with payo¤s a2 = a1; b2 =
a1 ¡ (d1 ¡ c1) = c1 + a1 ¡ d1; c2 = c1; d2 = c1 + a1 ¡ b1: G2 is also a game
of case 3 and due to the fact that all payo¤s originally are drawn from the
same uniform distribution, G2 has the same density as G1 conditioned on the
order of payo¤s (note that G2 is obtained from G1 by shifting d and b within
the range given by a and c). From a2¡b2 = a1¡(c1+a1¡d1) = d1¡c1 and
d2 ¡ c2 = c1 + a1 ¡ b1 ¡ c1 = a1 ¡ b1 follows in particular d2 ¡ c2 > a2 ¡ b2:
As in case 2, consider classes ¡1 and ¡2 of games of types G1 and G2:
Correspondingly, let p¤i and pi denote the equilibrium probability for a choice
of L in class ¡i for the case of risk neutrality and risk aversion, respectively.
Then the following three lemmas result.
Lemma 4 If player 1 is risk neutral p¤2 = p¤1, thus player 2 chooses the
same strategy over all games in the classes ¡1 and ¡2:
Proof. In equilibrium player 2 chooses p¤1 = d1¡b1d1¡b1+a1¡c1 =
1
1+a1¡c1d1¡b1
in all
games G1 in ¡1and p¤2 = d2¡b2d2¡b2+a2¡c2 =
1
1+a2¡c2d2¡b2
in all games G2 in ¡2 if
player 1 is risk neutral. From a2 ¡ c2 = a1 ¡ c1 and d2 ¡ b2 = c1 + a1 ¡ b1 ¡
(c1 + a1 ¡ d1) = d1 ¡ b1 follows p¤2 = p¤1.
Lemma 5 The total expected payo¤ to player 1 over both classes ¡1 and ¡2
will not be changed if player 2 changes p by the same margin over all games
in the union ¡ of these classes.
Proof. The total expected payo¤s to player 1 for the choices L and R
of player 2 over the classes ¡1 and ¡2 are E1(L) = 12(a1 + c1); E1(R) =
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1
2(b1 + d1), E2(L) =
1
2(a2 + c2) and E2(R) =
1
2(b2 + d2); respectively (see
the proof of Lemma 3). Since the union ¡ = ¡1 [ ¡2 consists of pairs
of games, one in each class, described as above, of the same density, the
total expected payo¤s for both choices L and R over the union are just
E¡(L) = E1(L) + E2(L) and E¡(R) = E1(R) + E2(R). Then
E¡(L) ¡ E¡(R) = 12(a1 + c1 + a2 + c2) ¡
1
2
(b1 + d1 + b2 + d2)
=
1
2
((a1 ¡ b1) ¡ (d2 ¡ c2) + (a2 ¡ b2) ¡ (d1 ¡ c1)) = 0:
Hence to player 1 the total expected payo¤ over both classes is the same
if player 2 chooses always R; always L or chooses some …xed p; as long as
it is the same for all games in the union. Consequently, the total expected
payo¤ to player 1 over both classes will not be changed if player 2 changes
p by the same margin ¢p over all games in the union of classes ¡1 and ¡2
because this just implies adding ¢p(E¡(L) ¡ E¡(R)) = 0 to the expected
payo¤.
Lemma 6 If player 1 is risk averse p1 > p2; thus player 2 chooses L with
higher probability in class ¡1 than in class ¡2:
Proof. If player 1’s utility function is given by U(x) then in equilibrium
player 2 chooses
p1 =
U(d1) ¡ U(b1)
U(d1) ¡ U(b1) + U(a1) ¡ U(c1) =
1
1 + U(a1)¡U(c1)U(d1)¡U(b1)
in all games G1 in ¡1 and
p2 =
U(d2) ¡ U(b2)
U(d2) ¡ U(b2) + U(a2) ¡ U(c2) =
1
1 + U(a2)¡U(c2)U(d2)¡U(b2)
in all games G2 in ¡2:
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Risk aversion implies
U(d2) ¡ U(b2) < U(d1) ¡ U(b1): (3)
This is established by the following argument. d2 ¡ b2 = d1 ¡ b1; hence
d2 + b1 = d1 + b2: Therefore the two lotteries L1; that yields both d2 and b1
with probability 12 ; and L2; that yields both d1 and b2 with probability
1
2 ;
have the same expected payo¤. But since d2 > d1 and b1 < b2 the variance
of L1 is higher than that of L2 and hence a risk averse player will prefer L2:
This in turn implies 12U(d2) +
1
2U(b1) <
1
2U(d1) +
1
2U(b2); which yields (3).
From (3) and a2 = a1 and c2 = c1 then p1 > p2 follows immediately.
By Lemma 4 p¤1 = p¤2: Thus if player 1 is risk neutral, player 2 chooses
L with the same probability in all games in ¡: Lemma 5 implies that the
total expected payo¤ over ¡ will not be changed if instead player 2 chooses
L with an arbitrary probability as long as it is the same for all games in
¡: In particular this will hold if this probability is p2: Now by Lemma 6, if
player 1 is risk averse, player 2 chooses L with probability p2 for all games
in ¡2 and with probability p1 > p2 for all games in ¡1: Over the whole class
¡1 a choice of L by player 2 is more preferable for player 1 than a choice of
R since E1(L)¡ E1(R) = 12(a1 ¡ b1 ¡ (d1 ¡ c1)) > 0 and hence the expected
payo¤ to player 1 over the class ¡1 increases with p: Thus the total expected
payo¤ to player 1 over ¡ is higher if he is risk averse than if player 2 chooses
L with probability p2 in all games in ¡; which in turn yields the same total
expected payo¤ as if player 1 is risk neutral. Summarizing, risk aversion
raises the total expected payo¤ to player 1 over a pair of classes ¡1 and ¡2
of case 3. Since the set of all games in case 3 falls into such pairs of classes,
the overall e¤ect of risk aversion of player 1 in case 3 is an increase of his
expected payo¤ in equilibrium.
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The statement of proposition 1 has been shown to be true for all three
cases independently and therefore it holds of course for the whole set of 2£2
games without pure equilibrium. Thus the proof is completed.
3 Extensions
There are two obvious directions in which the result of proposition 1 could be
generalized. First, one might wonder whether the results also hold for more
general distributions than the uniform distribution. The second obvious
direction to extend the results to is the comparison between di¤erent levels
of risk aversion, i.e. the question whether there is an optimal intermediate
level of risk aversion or whether the expected payo¤ is always increasing in
the degree of risk aversion.
Consider the second question …rst. It seems of particular interest if
one wants to use the results in evolutionary models for the explanation
of speci…c risk preferences. Assume that U is twice di¤erentiable. The
following two propositions then provide answers to this question. They
imply that in an evolutionary model (where the unique mixed equilibria are
always played and utility functions propagate according to the payo¤s of
its bearers) based on games of cases 1 and 2 the population would always
tend towards consisting of players with more extreme risk aversion, whereas
it would tend to consisting of players with …nite levels of risk aversion if
only games of case 3 were played. Over the whole class of 2 £ 2 Games
without pure equilibrium the e¤ect of increasing risk aversion is not clear
since the propositions only give rough estimates for the gains and losses due
to increasing risk aversion in the di¤erent cases, so they do not allow to
aggregate over all cases. Since the class of games studied is rather special
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in the …rst place, however, it is not much more restrictive to consider the
subcases separately. The simulation results in Huck et al. (1999) suggest
that the overall e¤ect of increasing risk aversion is positive.
Proposition 7 In cases 1 and 2 the expected payo¤ is increasing in the
degree of risk aversion. Hence if only games of these types were played, the
most risk averse players would be best o¤.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of proposition
1 for cases 1 and 2. An equivalent for Lemma 2 can be proved by the same
argument. In cases 1 and 2 the risk involved in a choice of T is larger than
the risk involved in a choice of B: Hence if a player 1 of type A is more
risk averse than a player 1 of type B, to be indi¤erent type A will require a
higher compensation, i.e. a higher expected payo¤ for T than type B. Now
as in the proof of Lemma 2, this implies that p will be larger if player 1 is
of type A (i.e. more risk averse) than if he is of type B. That the expected
payo¤ is increasing in p for every single game in case 1 is unrelated to the
degree of risk aversion and hence it is settled that the expected payo¤ in any
single game of case 1 increases with the degree of risk aversion. Lemma 3
does not depend on the degree of risk aversion either and thus over all games
in case 2 an increase in p increases the expected payo¤ to player 1. Hence
player 1’s expected payo¤ over the whole class of games of case 2 increases
in the degree of risk aversion.
Proposition 8 In case 3, if player 1’s Arrow-Pratt coe¢cient of absolute
risk aversion rA(x) = ¡U 00(x)U 0(x) tends towards in…nity, his expected payo¤ gain
compared to risk neutrality tends towards 0, whereas it is larger than some
positive value ° for at least some intermediate values of rA: This implies
12
that in case 3 the expected payo¤s for some positive but …nite levels of risk
aversion exceed those for extreme levels of risk aversion by a positive value.
Proof. The proof is based on Lemmas 10 and 11 below. Lemma 10 shows
that the expected payo¤ gain that risk aversion yields over risk neutrality
can be made arbitrarily small (i.e. smaller than any " > 0) by choosing rA(x)
su¢ciently large. On the other hand Lemma 11 shows that for absolute risk
aversion 13 < rA(x) <
5
3 for all x; the gain in expected payo¤s is larger than
some ° > 0: Thus by choosing " = °2 the expected payo¤ in the latter case
exceeds that in case of a degree of risk aversion as implied by Lemma 10 by
more than °2 > 0: Note, however, that even excessive degrees of risk aversion
still yield a higher expected payo¤ than risk neutrality.
In order to proof Lemma 10, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 9 For all " > 0 and ´ > 0 there exists K("; ´) such that if rA(x) >
K("; ´) for all x; then for all games of case 3 with b ¡ c > ´; the probability
that player 2 chooses L will be p < "2 :
Proof. Let rA(x) = ¡U 00(x)U 0(x) > K = K("; ´) for all x: This yields
U 00(x) < ¡KU 0(x): (4)
Let e = b+c2 : With (4) and U
00 < 0 then follows
U 0(b) = U 0(e) +
Z b
e
U 00(x)dx < U 0(e) ¡ K
Z b
e
U 0(x)dx < U 0(e) ¡ K(b ¡ e)U 0(b)
) (1 + K(b ¡ e))U 0(b) < U 0(e):
The probability that player 2 chooses L is given by
13
p =
U(d) ¡ U(b)
U(d) ¡ U(b) + U(a) ¡ U(c) =
R d
b U
0(x)dxR d
b U
0(x)dx +
R a
c U
0(x)dx
<
(d ¡ b)U 0(b)R d
b U
0(x)dx +
R a
c U
0(x)dx
<
(d ¡ b)U 0(b)R a
c U
0(x)dx
<
(d ¡ b)U 0(b)R e
c U
0(x)dx
<
(d ¡ b)U 0(b)
(e ¡ c)U 0(e) <
(d ¡ b)
(e ¡ c)
1
K(b ¡ e) =
4(d ¡ b)
K(b ¡ c)2 <
4
K´2
=
"
2
for K = K("; ´) =
8
"´2
:
Lemma 10 For " > 0 there exists K(") such that if player 1’s coe¢cient of
absolute risk aversion rA(x) > K(") for all x; then his expected payo¤ gain
compared to risk neutrality over all games of case 3 is < ":
Proof. Consider games of classes ¡1 and ¡2 as de…ned in the proof for case
3 in section 2. First choose ´(") su¢ciently small such that the games with
b1 ¡ c1 < ´(") have a mass of at most "2 . For games of classes ¡1 and ¡2
obviously p1 ¡ p2 · 1 and the maximal gain for player 1 if player 2 chooses
L instead of R is also 1. Hence (by application of Lemmas 4 and 5) the
maximal total gain in expected payo¤s of a risk averse compared to a risk
neutral player 1 over these games (with b1 ¡ c1 < ´(")) is "2 :
Now consider games with b2 ¡ c2 > b1 ¡ c1 > ´(") > 0: By Lemma 9, for
all these games if rA(x) > K("; ´(")) for all x, then p will be smaller than
"
2 . Lemma 6 shows for any speci…c utility function that p1 > p2: This yields
for any utility function with rA(x) > K("; ´(")) that 0 < p1 ¡ p2 < "2 : The
payo¤ gain from a choice of L by player 2 compared to R is at most 1 and
hence the total gain over classes ¡1; ¡2 of games with b2¡c2 > b1¡c1 > ´(")
in expected payo¤s is < "2 : Hence if rA(x) > K(") = K("; ´(")), then the
total gain over all games of case 3 compared to risk neutrality is < "2 +
"
2 = ":
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Lemma 11 If for player 1’s coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion 13 < rA(x) <
5
3 for all x, then his total expected payo¤ over all games of case 3 exceeds
that for risk neutrality by at least ° with ° > 2¡28:
Proof. The values 13 and
5
3 are somewhat arbitrary and are chosen for
convenience. They only serve to show that for some intermediate level of
risk aversion the gains are above some positive lower bound.
Lemma 6 implies that for any pair of classes of subgames there is a gain
from risk aversion over risk neutrality. Hence to …nd a lower bound for the
total gains from a speci…c degree of risk aversion one can limit the attention
to some of these classes in order to simplify the proof. (Note that this leaves
out a large part of the gains. In addition, most of the inequalities below are
very rough. Hence the actual gains over all games in case 3 will be much
larger than °.)
Consider pairs of classes of games with a > 78 ;
1
4 < d1 <
3
8 ; c <
1
16 < b1 <
1
8 : This implies (with b2 = c + a ¡ d1) b2 ¡ d1 > 18 and d1 ¡ b1 > 18 : With
1
3 < rA(x) <
5
3 , ¡53U 0(x) < U 00(x) < ¡13U 0(x) one obtains the following
two auxiliary inequalities
U 0(b2) = U 0(d1) +
Z b2
d1
U 00(x)dx < U 0(d1) ¡ 13
Z b2
d1
U 0(x)dx
< U 0(d1) ¡ 13(b2 ¡ d1)U
0(b2)
, U 0(b2) < U
0(d1)
1 + 13(b2 ¡ d1)
) U 0(d1) ¡ U 0(b2) >
1
3(b2 ¡ d1)
1 + 13(b2 ¡ d1)
U 0(d1) (5)
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and
U 0(d1) = U 0(c) +
Z d1
c
U 00(x)dx > U 0(c) ¡ 5
3
Z d1
c
U 0(x)dx
> U 0(c) ¡ 5
3
(d1 ¡ c)U 0(c) =
µ
1 ¡ 5
3
(d1 ¡ c)
¶
U 0(c): (6)
Now the di¤erence between the probabilities for L in classes ¡1 and ¡2 is
p1 ¡ p2 = U(d1) ¡ U(b1)U(d1) ¡ U(b1) + U(a) ¡ U(c) ¡
U(d2) ¡ U(b2)
U(d2) ¡ U(b2) + U(a) ¡ U(c)
=
(U(a) ¡ U(c)) (U(d1) ¡ U(b1) ¡ U(d2) + U(b2))
(U(d1) ¡ U(b1) + U(a) ¡ U(c)) (U(d2) ¡ U(b2) + U(a) ¡ U(c))
>
(U(a) ¡ U(c)) (U(d1) ¡ U(b1) ¡ U(d2) + U(b2))
4 (U(a) ¡ U(c))2
=
U(d1) ¡ U(b1) ¡ U(d2) + U(b2)
4 (U(a) ¡ U(c)) =
R d1
b1 U
0(x)dx ¡ R d2b2 U 0(x)dx
4
R a
c U
0(x)dx
>
(d1 ¡ b1)(U 0(d1) ¡ U 0(b2))
4
R a
c U
0(x)dx =
1
4
(d1 ¡ b1)(U 0(d1) ¡ U 0(b2))R d1
c U
0(x)dx +
R a
d1 U
0(x)dx
>
1
4
(d1 ¡ b1)(U 0(d1) ¡ U 0(b2))
(d1 ¡ c)U 0(c) + (a ¡ d1)U 0(d1)
(5)
>
1
4
(d1 ¡ b1)
1
3 (b2¡d1)
1+ 13 (b2¡d1)
U 0(d1)
(d1 ¡ c)U 0(c) + (a ¡ d1)U 0(d1)
(6)
>
1
4
(d1 ¡ b1)
1
3 (b2¡d1)
1+ 13 (b2¡d1)
U 0(d1)
(d1¡c)
1¡53 (d1¡c)
U 0(d1) + (a ¡ d1)U 0(d1)
>
1
4
1
8
1
25
2
= 5¡22¡6:
If player 2 chooses L instead of R in class ¡1; player 1’s expected payo¤
increases by
1
2
(a ¡ b1 ¡ (d1 ¡ c)) > 12
µ
3
4
¡ 3
8
¶
=
3
16
:
By Lemmas 4 and 5 the expected payo¤ would be equal to that in case of
risk neutrality if player 2 chose L with probability p2 in both classes ¡1 and
16
¡2: Thus since player 2 chooses p1 in class ¡1; player 1’s expected payo¤
over any pair of classes ¡1 and ¡2 exceeds that of risk neutrality by at least
(p1 ¡ p2) 316 > 5
¡22¡6 3
16
= 5¡22¡103:
The total mass of the classes of games considered is at least
¡1
8
¢2 ¡ 1
16
¢2 =
2¡14: Hence the total gain in expected payo¤s over all games of case 3 by
absolute risk aversion of 13 < rA(x) <
5
3 for all x compared to risk neutrality
is (much) larger than ° := 5¡22¡243 > 2¡28:
Concerning the question whether the results also hold if the payo¤s are
drawn from more general distributions than the uniform distribution, it is
straightforward to see that in cases 1 and 2 the results do not depend on
the distribution as long as all payo¤s are drawn from the same distribution.
Since Lemma 2 holds for any single game it is completely independent of
the distribution. Lemma 3 only uses that the payo¤s are all drawn from the
same distribution without making any requirements on its form. The results
do not, however, extend to case 3. This is because in case 3 there are classes
of games where risk aversion increases the expected payo¤ as well as those
where it decreases expected payo¤s. The way to get around this problem in
the proof of proposition 1 for case 3 is to pair up classes which yield a total
positive e¤ect of risk aversion. This, however, requires that in each pair
of games both games have the same density. For this to hold for all classes
requires a uniform distribution. Alternative ways to aggregate games do not
yield the desired results either. For example if the distribution is symmetric
around 12 one can pair a game in ¡1 with another game that is obtained by
re‡ecting the payo¤s around 12 , i.e. a2 = 1¡ c1; b2 = 1¡d1; c2 = 1¡a1; d2 =
1 ¡ b1: The equivalence of Lemmas 4 and 5 then hold, but that of Lemma 6
does not.
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Summing up these two generalizations yields that if only games of cases
1 and 2 are considered, then more risk averse players are always in advantage
to less risk averse players, independent of the distribution that the payo¤s
are drawn from. If, however, games of case 3 are considered, then while
there is an overall positive e¤ect of risk aversion compared to risk neutrality
in the case of a uniform distribution, this result does not easily extend to
more general distributions and more risk aversion leads to lower expected
payo¤s if it exceeds some …nite level.
There are further possible extensions of the present analysis. Extending
the strategy space is likely to yield qualitatively similar results, but will
require the consideration of many more subcases, including di¤erentiating
between mixed and completely mixed equilibria. The same holds for multi-
player games. Given the weak results of the simulations in Huck et al. (1999)
eliminating the restriction to games without pure equilibria will, even if the
result still holds, probably render the proof much less straightforward. This
is in particular the case since in the class of games studied by Strobel (2001)
risk taking is favored.
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